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I. Introduction
In crafting the United States Constitution, the framers recognized the vital importance of
innovation with respect to the success and longevity of our nation.1 The United States remains
among the top global innovators, but that does not mean our nation is free of issues related to
technological innovation.2 In the modern era, technology pervades nearly every aspect of society
from the economy to education and even national security, as depicted by the current technological
arms race between the United States and other nations.3 But apart from global threats to our
nation’s innovation, such as intellectual property theft and technological arms races,4 the last
decade has introduced internal concerns that may threaten our current innovative landscape,
specifically with respect to the patent process.5
While contemporary technology has come an incredibly long way since our nation’s
beginning, the constitutional goal of patent law remains the same—to promote the useful arts by
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balancing inventor incentives against the liberal use of increasingly accessible information.6 That
being said, modern innovation has introduced challenges in interpreting and applying the law. One
such challenge has been the application of section 101 of the Patent Act, which establishes
patentable subject matter,7 or in other words, what things can be patented, to the rapidly advancing
fields of medicine and computer science.8 The literal text of section 101 allows for the patenting
of any “useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.”9 In addition to the statutory language, the courts created judicial exceptions
to these categories which bar the patenting of laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract
ideas.10 In response to this hurdle, the Supreme Court developed a test, known as the “Alice/Mayo
Test,”11 which has led various players of the current patent-law paradigm to reach conflicting
conclusions and has produced troubling results for the last decade.12 For instance, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has rejected a majority of recent medical diagnostic because of
ineligible subject matter.13 Even the Federal Circuit voiced its concern over the current test for
subject matter eligibility, but nonetheless felt constrained by Supreme Court precedent.14 This
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this test to abstract ideas).
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going to . . . kill . . . virtually all of the medical diagnostic patents, what role does the federal circuit really play?”).
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See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring) (“But
for the sweeping language in the Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion, I see no reason, in policy or statute, why this
breakthrough invention should be deemed patent ineligible.”).
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uncertainty and unpredictability has reaching effects on our nation as a whole.15 Accordingly,
there have been multiple proposed solutions including administrative guidance, institutional
reform, and most recently, a proposed congressional reform of section 101 of the Patent Act
itself.16
When evaluating the recent congressional reform in particular, it is important to analyze
the potential judicial reaction to the new statutory language. Focusing on the courts posits a
number of questions with respect to the future of section 101. How will the courts respond to the
potential section 101 reform? Will the reform ultimately produce a change in overall patentability
of software and biotechnological innovations? Do the courts have other, perhaps more appropriate
options to consider in addressing their current concerns? This comment investigates these
questions and ultimately concludes that the congressional reform has the potential to resolve the
major section 101 issues but is unlikely to produce any dramatic shift in overall patentability.
Section II will provide a review of the current state of subject matter eligibility and its
flaws. Section III will analyze the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) recent
attempt to remedy the current disarray. Section IV will discuss the recent draft bill proposed to
reform section 101. Section V will explore the reforms weaknesses and argue that, although the
draft bill is unlikely to actually produce any sweeping changes in overall patentability, it is still a
step in the right direction that the courts should embrace. Section VI will conclude.
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See Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (discussing the impact intellectual property has on our economy, research and
development, and international intellectual property theft).
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PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE (2019) [hereinafter USPTO Guidance] (administrative approach);
Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4 (statutory approach); Kristen Osenga, Article: Institutional Design for Innovation: A
Radical Proposal for Addressing § 101 Patent-eligible Subject Matter, 68 AM. U.L. REV. 1191 (2019) [hereinafter
Osenga, Institutional Reform] (institutional approach).
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II. The Current State of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
The evolution of subject matter eligibility jurisprudence warrants review in order to
illustrate the courts role with regard to the current chaos in the field. But before delving into the
case law, it is important to recognize the statutory background and requirements of patentability.
Once this foundation is established, the current state of subject matter eligibility and its issues will
be explored.
A. Statutory Sources of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Congressional power to regulate patents derives from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the . . . useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.” 17 When
Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952 it not only codified existing law into the sections used
today, but also responded to, and overruled, some of the Court’s case law.18 Section 101 of the
Patent Act establishes statutory subject matter eligibility, as well as the utility requirement, and
simply provides, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 19 While section 101 lies
at the heart of the current subject matter eligibility debacle, it is important to recognize the other
requirements of patentability, namely that an invention be novel,20 not obvious or
“nonobviousness” to a person skilled in the relevant field,21 and adequately disclosed in the patent
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl 8.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011); JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
11 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 7th ed. 2018) (noting, inter alia, how “section 112 overturned the invalidation of “means
plus function” claims and section 103 regarding Nonobviousness supplanted “the ‘flash of genius’ test”).
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35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
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specification.22 In addition to these statutory sources, the Court has developed a great deal of
section 101 doctrine in the last decade, which some refer to as the “federal common law of
patents.”23
B. Judicially Created Subject Matter Eligibility Doctrine
Given section 101’s relatively succinct guidance, the courts have used the relevant
constitutional language in conjunction with section 101 to find implicit limitations on patent
eligible subject matter.24 For instance, in the early 1980’s the Court established what may be the
most influential judicial exception to subject matter eligibility by holding that “laws of nature,
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” cannot be patented.25 Although the text of section 101
fails to mention laws of nature or abstract ideas whatsoever, the Court used the underlying
constitutional goal of balancing incentives to innovate against restrictions on further innovation to
reach the conclusion that laws of nature should be off limits.26 But as the Court has recognized,
such a rule is complicated by the fact that virtually every invention utilizes a law of nature or
abstract idea to some extent.27 This intrinsic conflict has come to a head in the recent decade as
courts have struggled to craft a reliable test to distinguish inventions that merely apply a judicial
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35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring a written description, enablement, and best mode).
Eric Guttag, Why is SCOTUS Creating a Federal Common Law of Patents, IP Watchdog (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/10/scotus-federal-common-law-patents/id=103946/.
24
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (using judicial reasoning to establish the policy that “laws of
nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas” should not be patentable, despite the absence of such language in
section 101, because patenting these exceptions would contravene the constitutional purpose of patent law).
25
Id. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (suggesting that “[a]nything under the sun that is
made by man” may be patented).
26
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (“patent protection strikes a
delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘impeding the flow
of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”).
27
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (“The Court has recognized,
however, that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions
at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”).
23

6

exception, and are therefore worthy of patent rights, from those that seek to monopolize the
exception itself.28
The Court’s recently developed test for determining whether a process incorporates a
judicial exception in a manner that warrants patentability has been the primary issue in the area of
subject matter eligibility.29 This test, known as the “Alice/Mayo test,” originated in Mayo
Collaborative Serv. Inc. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., which involved a patented process for
optimizing the dose of thiopurine drugs used in treating autoimmune diseases.30 Essentially, the
process involved giving the drug; drawing blood to determine metabolite levels; and then using
these levels to determine whether the dosage should be maintained, increased, or decreased.31 The
district court found the patented process invalid because it effectively claimed the natural law or
phenomena that are “the correlations between thiopurine levels and the toxicity and efficacy of
thiopurine drug dosages.”32 The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the patent claims valid because
the steps involved transformation of the patient’s body or blood, in addition to the natural
correlations.33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded, explaining that the
“machine or transformation test” used by the Federal Circuit was not a definitive test of eligibility,
but only a helpful clue.34 Again, the Federal Circuit found the patent claims did not encompass a
natural law and reaffirmed its earlier decision.35 Once again the Court granted certiorari and

See id. at 77 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that
process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the law of nature itself.”).
29
See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DOCKET NO. PTO-P-2018-0053, 2019 REVISED PATENT
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE (2019) [hereinafter USPTO Guidance] 50, 50 (“Properly applying the
Alice/Mayo test in a consistent manner has proven to be difficult, and has caused uncertainty in this area of law.”).
30
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73.
31
Id. at 74–75.
32
Id. at 76.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 76–77.
35
Id.
28
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created what is now known as the Alice/Mayo test,36 which is comprised of two steps and relates
back to the long-held rationale for judicial exceptions in preventing broad preemption of future
innovation.37
Under the Alice/Mayo test a court first determines whether the claims at issue are directed
to a judicial exception or patent ineligible concept.38 If the answer is yes, then the court must
analyze the additional claim elements individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
whether these elements “transform the nature of the claim” into something patent eligible.39 The
Supreme Court described the second step of this analysis as the search for an "inventive concept"—
an element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."40 The Court also
emphasized that additional steps must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional steps
previously engaged in by scientists in the field.”41 Applying this test to the patent in Mayo, the
Court found the claims invalid because they were directed to natural correlations and the
conventional steps failed to transform the claim in a manner that warranted patentability.42
In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Int’l the Court expanded the test established in Mayo
by applying it to claims involving abstract ideas.43 Alice involved patents disclosing a “computerimplemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ by using a third-party intermediary.”44 The
Court found the claims directed “to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement” and concluded

36

Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12, 2015) (“The Supreme Court has
made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability.”).
38
Id. at 1375.
39
Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
40
Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
41
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67.
42
Id. at 78.
43
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014).
44
Id.
37
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that requiring the use of a generic computer was insufficient to satisfy the second step of the Mayo
analysis.45 Having failed the Mayo analysis, the Court held the patented claims invalid as covering
ineligible subject matter.46 This decision’s incorporation of abstract ideas into the Mayo analysis
brought the Alice/Mayo test to its current state.
C. Issues with the Current Subject Matter Eligibility Paradigm
Unfortunately, applying this test to modern innovations has proven difficult, particularly
in the biotechnology and computer science fields.47 Take Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. for example.48 First, a split Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that
the claims to isolated DNA molecules covered ineligible subject matter, with each of the three
judges analyzing the eligibility of the claims differently.49 Judge Lourie, writing for the court,
based his determination on the premise that isolated DNA is chemically separated from its native
element and is therefore a distinct chemical entity with a “markedly different chemical structure
compared to native DNA.”50 Judge Lourie also gave weight to the PTO’s long-standing practice
of finding isolated DNA molecules patent eligible.51

Judge Moore, concurring-in-part, agreed

with Judge Lourie’s reasoning, but also asked whether the differences from natural form provided
new utility that renders the new form markedly different.52 In contrast, Judge Bryson, dissenting
with respect to these claims, concluded that the isolated DNA was structurally and functionally

45

Id.
Id.
47
See USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 50. (discussing how the PTO, courts, and patent stakeholders have
expressed concern for the clarity and predictability of the Alice/Mayo test); Borella supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined..
48
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
49
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
50
Id. at 1352–53.
51
Id. at 1354–55 (“[O]ur decision that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible comports with the longstanding
practice of the PTO. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that changes from longstanding practice should come
from congress, not the courts.”).
52
Id. at 1365 (Moore, J., concurring).
46
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equivalent to the native gene, despite being chemically extracted, and therefore did not deserve
patent protection.53 Judge Bryson also disagreed with giving significant weight to the PTO’s
practices54 and voiced preemptive concerns.55 Upon grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case to be considered in light of the Alice/Mayo test.56
On remand, the Federal Circuit considered the claims pertaining to the isolated DNA in
light of the Mayo decision and reaffirmed their finding of patent eligibility with each Judge
reiterating their earlier reasoning.57 Once again, the Supreme Court took the case, this time
addressing the Judges’ reasoning.58 In respect to the claims covering the isolated DNA, the Court
held “that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because
they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.”59 The Court construed the claims
as focusing on the genetic information encoded in the isolated molecule, rather than the chemical
composition of the molecule itself, and rejected the idea that isolating the relevant DNA sequence
by severing chemical bonds produced a non-natural, patent-eligible molecule.60
The Myriad case and its varying judicial conclusions make abundantly clear the
complicated, subjective, and even philosophical nature of the judicial exceptions and subject
matter eligibility. 61 The fact that the Federal Circuit judges—who are experts in the field of patent

Id. at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“What is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic coding material, and that
material is the same, structurally and functionally, in both the native gene and the isolated form of the gene.”).
54
Id. at 1380 (“[T]he PTO’s practice and guidelines are not entitled to significant weight, for . . . the PTO lacks
substantive rulemaking authority as to issues such as patentability.”).
55
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Nonetheless, it is
important to consider the effects of such broad patent claims on the biotechnology field.”).
56
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 (2012).
57
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The remand of this case for
consideration in light of Mayo might suggest . . . that the composition claims are mere reflections of a law of nature.
Respectfully, they are not, any more than any product of man reflects and is consistent with a law of nature.”).
58
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 587–89 (2013).
59
Id. at 596.
60
Id. at 593.
61
BRIAN CASSIDY, Analysis: Patent Subject-matter Eligibility – A Widening Gap, BLOOMBERG LAW ANALYSIS (April
18, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-patent-subject-matter-eligibility-awidening-gap (“The issue of subject matter eligibility is complex and somewhat philosophical by nature.”).
53
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law—reached identical conclusions both before and after applying the Alice/Mayo test illustrates
one of the challenges, or even the futility, of the judicially crafted doctrine. 62 The test also fails
to provide effective guidance as to what constitutes an abstract idea or inventive concept that
adequately incorporates a judicial exception in a manner worthy of patentability.63 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court’s emphasis on conventionality when searching for an inventive concept appears
to conflate subject matter eligibility with other sections of the Patent Act, namely novelty and
nonobviousness under sections 102 and 103 respectively, which the Court has explicitly warned
against.64 The Court’s contradiction of its own precedent, apparent misunderstanding of patent
doctrine, and minimal guidance has set the stage for far reaching implications.
Most importantly, the varied applications of the Alice/Mayo test and the ensuing
uncertainty and unpredictability disincentivizes innovation by weakening patent protection.65 Not
only are inventors less likely to expend the resources necessary to develop novel technology when
their discoveries may ultimately be vulnerable to theft, directly impacting innovation, but investors
are also less likely to finance such endeavors.66 This can negatively impact our nation’s economy
by deterring domestic investment,67 especially with the vital role tech startups have in our modern,
technologically dependent society.68 In conjunction with the economic effects, the current discord
also implicates national security, given the major role computer science innovations play in the

Compare Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2011), with
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
63
See USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.
64
Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5.
65
See Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned At Patent Reform Hearings (Jun. 24, 2019),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/6/tillis-and-coons-what-we-learned-at-patent-reform-hearings (discussing the
negative impact the current lack of clarity and certainty with respect to patent eligibility has had on research and
investment in areas like medical diagnostics and artificial intelligence).
66
See Borella, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“[S]tudies show[] that investors familiar with the current
lack of clarity invest less in critical research and development in areas like medical diagnostics and artificial
intelligence, at least in the Unites States.”).
67
Id.
68
See Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5 (discussing the major implications of the current subject
matter eligibility disarray on high-tech startups).
62
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current technological arms race between our nation and other technologically advanced countries
like China.69
But what is perhaps the most concerning aspect of these issues is the Supreme Court’s
apparent satisfaction with the current state of subject matter eligibility70 and incompetence in
effectively crafting patent doctrine.71 The Patent Office’s recent guidance and the recent draft bill
to reform section 101, both of which will be discussed below, reflect the growing concern and
destabilization surrounding the Alice and Mayo decisions. 72 While congressional action may be a
step towards fixing the current disarray, it may not have as large an impact on overall patentability
as proponents of the reform may hope.
III. Recent United States Patent and Trademark Office Effort to Clarify Alice/Mayo
The Alice/Mayo test has confused those involved at nearly every step of the patent
process.73 As the agency responsible for issuing patents, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office recently sought to clarify the analysis by revising the patent examiners application of the
Alice/Mayo test in two ways. 74 First, the PTO enumerates categories of abstract ideas.75 Second,
it attempts to clarify the first step of the Alice/Mayo analysis by defining what it means for a claim

See id. (“It is because of the Supreme Court that investors interested in artificial intelligence are taking their money
to China and funding startups there.”); Clark, supra note 4 (discussing China’s alleged theft of intellectual property
and technology); Rosie Perper, Huawei Slams Trump’s ‘Unreasonable’ Ban, Saying That the Move Will Only Harm
US Interests in Its Own 5G Rollout, Business Insider (May 16, 2019, 12:06 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/huawei-responds-trump-china-tech-national-emergency-ban-2019-5?r=cold
(discussing the potential security risk with a Chinese company’s 5G technology serving as a backdoor for espionage).
70
See Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned At Patent Reform Hearing (Jun. 24, 2019),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/6/tillis-and-coons-what-we-learned-at-patent-reform-hearings
(noting
“the
Supreme Court’s denying over 40 petitions for certiorari on this topic since its disruptive decision in the Alice case
five years ago”).
71
See Did the Supreme Court Destroy Patents, supra note 5 (describing the Supreme Court as incapable of forming
patent policy).
72
See USPTO 2019 Guidance, supra note 29, at 50; Tillis Draft Bill, supra note 4.
73
See Press Release, Tillis and Coons: What We Learned At Patent Reform Hearings, supra note 37 (noting that
inventors, the USPTO, and judges alike have struggled to determine what is subject matter eligible).
74
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.
75
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.
69
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to be “directed to” a judicial exception.76 But while the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter “the Guidance”) reflects a valiant effort to bring stability to the
current state of affairs, it has failed to meaningfully influence the courts.77
A. Categorizing Abstract Ideas
The first way in which the Guidance seeks to promote consistent application of the
Alice/Mayo test pertains to the determination of whether the claims recite a judicial exception,
specifically in regards to abstract ideas.78 Since the inception of the Alice/Mayo test the Federal
Circuit has issued a growing number of decisions identifying abstract and non-abstract subject
matter.79 Many of these decisions, however, reach differing conclusions with respect to similar
subject matter, which makes drawing the line between abstract and non-abstract a significant
challenge.80

The Guidance seeks to clarify what constitutes an abstract idea by explicitly

enumerating three new groupings of subject matter that fall within the abstract idea exception.81
These general groupings include mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity, and mental processes or concepts carried out in the human mind.82 The Guidance provides
specific examples of each from the case law and up to this point, provides a theoretically effective
method for consistently identifying abstract ideas.83 But, the determination of abstract idea does
not end there.

76

USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.
See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013, 1021 (Fed. Cir. April 1,
2019) (refusing to defer to the Guidance); ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., No. 2018-1739, 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1919, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2019) (refusing to defer to the Guidance categorization of abstract ideas).
78
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 50.
79
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52.
80
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52.
81
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51–53.
82
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51–53.
83
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 51–53.
77
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The Guidance also establishes a procedure for determining whether subject matter that does
not fall neatly within one of these categories should nonetheless be treated as an abstract idea. 84
This procedure essentially entails treating the “tentative abstract idea” as if it were a judicial
exception and proceeding with the Alice/Mayo analysis to determine whether the additional
elements provide the requisite inventive concept.85 If the answer to that question is yes, the
determination of whether the subject matter is abstract is irrelevant and the subject matter is
eligible.86 If the answer is no, however, then the examiner is told to notify the Technology Center
Director, who must then record and provide justification for any claim limitation they determine
recites an abstract idea.87 This is where the potential benefit of consistency comes into question.
By leaving the determination of tentative abstract ideas up to the director, who can easily come to
a different conclusion than a judge, this portion of the revision does little more than provide a
consolidated list of abstract ideas enunciated in the case law, which examiners already consider.88
But this is not to say that the principle underlying the procedure is unsound. The second opinion,
recording, and justification procedure may very well promote consistency within the PTO. Rather,
the issue is with the PTO’s limited authority and the inherently complicated, and to some extent,
subjective flaws of the judicially created abstract idea exception.89
B. Determining Whether A Claim Is “Directed To” A Judicial Exception
The second way in which the Guidance revises the examiners application of the
Alice/Mayo test pertains to the first step of the test: determining whether a claim is “directed to” a

84

USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 52–53.
USPTO Guidance, supra note 29, at 57.
86
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judicial exception.90 The Guidance teaches that if the claim, in its entirety, integrates the recited
exception into a practical application then it is not directed to that judicial exception. 91 The
Guidance further explains that “a claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical
application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.”92 Here, the PTO attempts to cater to the Supreme Court’s
“inventive concept” principle exemplified in Mayo.93 While the guidance does not purport to
change the second “inventive concept” step of the Alice/Mayo analysis, it does explicitly note that
the conventionality of additional elements should only impact analysis under this second step.94
In theory, excluding questions of conventionality from the first step should result in fewer claims
reaching the inventive concept step by lowering the bar for determining whether a claim adequately
integrates a judicial exception. This interpretation, however, is misleading because sufficient
integration is admittedly dependent on the inclusion of a “meaningful limit on the judicial
exception” so that the claim does not monopolize the judicial exception. 95 Again, the Guidance
does nothing more than cite specific examples from case law where such a “meaningful limit” was
found or absent.96 Nor does the Guidance address the question of whether conventionality should
play a role in subject matter eligibility at all, given the role conventional or routine steps have with
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respect to the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.97 That being said, the PTO cannot be
blamed for the practical limitations of the Guidance or for overlooking this flaw when taking into
account their duty to follow policy, rather than craft it.
C. The Guidance’s Impact on the Courts
Ultimately, the Guidance effectively reflects the PTO’s attempts to use what little direction
the judicial precedent has provided for the complicated, and somewhat subjective, application of
the Alice/Mayo test. Perhaps this lack of direction is why the Guidance fails to elaborate on the
inventive concept step of the analysis. Or, perhaps, guidance on the inherently subjective and
flawed notion of an inventive concept is itself impossible.

In fact, the inventive concept

requirement can be seen as akin to the “flash of creative genius” test98 that was used to determine
obviousness until it was finally overridden by Congress.99
While the Guidance suffers from the aforementioned limitations on its practical utility, it
also bears a more fundamental flaw that indicates the need for congressional intervention in the
field. Namely, the futility of the PTO’s effort to clarify the current state of subject matter eligibility
is most apparent when looking at the impact, or lack thereof, the Guidance has had on the courts.
The Guidance admits its lack of binding authority on the courts, given that it is not law but rather
a guide for patent examiners and administrative judges at the PTO. 100 Recent Federal Circuit
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decisions have exposed this lack of binding authority and shown the potential for different results
when applying the Guidance as compared to judicial review. 101
In Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Cleveland Clinic II), the
Federal Circuit addressed the subject matter eligibility of a method for identifying an elevated level
of myeloperoxidase (MPO), a biomarker for increased risk of cardiovascular disease, in human
plasma.102 The steps to the method involved collecting a sample, probing the sample with an
antibody, detecting the biomarker levels, and comparing these with healthy reference samples.103
In finding the patent invalid as directed to the natural correlation between MPO levels and
cardiovascular disease, the court explicitly declined to defer to the Guidance.104 Under the
Guidance it would have been reasonable to end the Alice/Mayo analysis at step one. The method
steps essentially applied well-understood techniques, such as anti-body probing and detection, to
elevated biomarker levels limited in use to determining a patient’s cardiovascular risk.105 In other
words, the claim effectively integrated the judicial exception into a practical application while
imparting the arguably meaningful limit of use in determining cardiovascular risk.106
ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc. also exemplifies the Federal Circuit’s reluctance
to follow the Guidance, but with respect to the enumerated abstract idea categories.107 The patent
at issue in ChargePoint was an apparatus that allowed for remote control of vehicle charging
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stations.108 The court found that the claim involved “the abstract idea of communicating requests
to a remote server and receiving communication from that server.”109 In finding that the claim was
directed to this abstract idea the court highlighted the fact that the invention appears to do nothing
more than apply the concept of network-communication in the setting of electrical vehicle
charging, despite being limited to the context of vehicle charging.110 The invention in ChargePoint
was an apparatus, a physical object, and as such does not fit intuitively into the category of
mathematical concept, an organization of human activity, or a mental process, as the Guidance
would require.111
These cases represent two of the many instances where the courts and the PTO have
struggled with modern subject matter eligibility doctrine.112 Ultimately, the courts’ reluctance to
follow the Guidance can be seen as a result of its lack of binding authority on the courts.113 But
there may be a deeper issue at play, one relating to interpretation. After all, the courts could have
applied the Guidance’s analysis if they determined it was appropriate. Perhaps the courts simply
disagree with the PTO in regard to its interpretation of the current subject matter jurisprudence.
While purporting to follow judicial precedent, the Guidance could be viewed as actually expanding
the bounds of the Alice/Mayo test,114 providing further reason for the courts’ lack of deference.
Or perhaps the Federal Circuit feels straight-jacketed by Supreme Court precedent and chooses to
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apply the Alice/Mayo test broadly out of fear of being overruled once again,115 despite their
disagreement with the test in at least some cases.116 The Guidance’s failure illustrates the
Alice/Mayo test’s tendency to produce inconsistent results, as well as the PTO’s inability to stifle
the current subject matter eligibility chaos. In fact, the Guidance’s failure can even be viewed as
a cry for help when considering the PTO’s self-recognition of their limited authority. Congress
has heard this cry and now seeks to address it.117
IV. Congressional Reform of Section 101
While the PTO may lack the power required to influence the courts position on subject
matter eligibility, Congress has the power to enact legislation that even the Supreme Court,
arguably, must follow. Inventors, PTO officials, Federal Circuit Judges, investors, scholars,
business leaders, trade groups, and patient advocates have voiced growing concerns about the last
decade of Alice/Mayo decisions and evinced the need for congressional intervention;118 And
Congress has answered the call.119 In May 2019, Senator Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), chairman of the
Senate Judiciary subcommittee on intellectual property, released a draft bill that would reform
section 101 of the Patent Act.120 While still in its infancy, the draft bill makes a number of
seemingly drastic modifications to section 101,121 each of which will be analyzed below.
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A. Splitting Section 101
First, the draft bill splits section 101 into two sections.122 Draft section B states that
“eligibility under this section shall be determined only while considering the claimed invention as
a whole, without discounting or disregarding any claim limitation.”123 This is a relatively straight
forward section that simply reaffirms the importance of viewing a claim in its entirety, rather than
focusing on any particular limitation, and should have minimal practical effect since step two of
the Alice/Mayo analysis already considers the claim as whole.124 Rather, this is likely to serve a
supporting role for the other reform provisions.
Reformed section 101 also reflects a subtle change to the statute’s otherwise untouched
language. Reformed section 101 removes the term “new” from the phrase “new and useful”
employed in the current version of section 101.125 While this may be to resolve the apparent
redundancy of the term “new” in section 101, given that section 102 is dedicated entirely to
novelty, it may also reflect congressional intent to do more than fix a simple drafting
redundancy.126 This intent is especially apparent, as illustrated below, when investigating the
underlying rationale for the more radical changes proposed in the draft bill.
B. Abrogating the Judicial Exceptions to Subject Matter Eligibility
The first of the more substantive reform provisions states that “no implicit or other
judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility, including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of
nature,’ or ‘natural phenomena,’ shall be used to determine patent eligibility under section 101,
and all cases establishing or interpreting those exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated.”127
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This facially radical section makes clear Congress’s disapproval of the “federal common law of
patents” relating to subject matter eligibility exceptions and overrules the Alice/Mayo line of
cases.128
Initially, the Supreme Court will likely be concerned with such a drastic alteration of
section 101 doctrine. After all, the judicial exceptions appear to play an integral role in the overall
purpose of patent law by preventing monopolization of the “building blocks of human
ingenuity.”129 Given the Court’s emphasis on preemption, it would not be surprising if the Court
deemed this provision unconstitutional by hindering the advancement of the useful arts. 130 This
may be true even with the Court’s apparent, yet ironic recognition that it is Congress’s
responsibility to create new laws.131 But, the Court’s track record of respecting congressional intent
in the field of patent law132 and the Court’s apparent restraint with respect to recent opportunities
to engage in judicial activism may suggest otherwise.133 Furthermore, this modification to section
101 is less concerning when considering Congress’s potential motives for such a facially radical
change.
Perhaps Congress is merely rejecting the Court’s opinion that other sections of the patent
act cannot adequately supplant section 101 in preventing the patenting of natural laws, phenomena,
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and abstract ideas.134 In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., the Court faced this
argument and rejected it solely on the grounds that it would effectively destroy the judicial
exceptions and conflict with prior law.135 In support of its rejection the Court offered only
conclusory statements that the other sections are not equipped to handle this role and relying on
them would increase the risk of uncertainty.136 But this view is undermined by the Court’s own
conflation of sections 102 and 103 with 101 in the Alice/Mayo test, which suggests that
requirements such as novelty and obviousness may already be supplanting the judicial exceptions,
albeit under the guise of section 101.137 Further evidence of Congress’s disapproval of the Court’s
conflation of the different patentability requirements can be found in the next reform provision.
C. The Role of Conventionality
Similar to the Guidance, the next provision of the Tillis Draft Bill states that the
determination of subject matter eligibility should not depend at all on the manner in which an
invention is made, whether individual limitations are well-known, conventional or routine, or “any
other considerations relating to sections 102, 103, or 112 of this title.” 138 Aside from explicitly
abrogating the use of conventionality in subject matter eligibility analysis, this provision makes
explicit Congress’s condemnation of the Court’s conflation of sections 101, 102, 103, and 112.139
By explicitly and broadly excluding the use of any considerations relating to novelty, obviousness,
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or written description, this provision further reflects Congress’ view that these other sections of
the Patent Act can effectively replace the judicial exceptions.140
D. Reformed Section 101 Favoring Eligibility
The third and final provision of the draft bill best represents what Congress views as section
101’s role in determining patentability in general and simply states that “section 101 shall be
construed in favor of eligibility.”141 This relatively straight-forward provision ties together the
proposed provisions analyzed above. Supported by the other aspects of the reform, this provision
clearly reflects Congress’s dissatisfaction with the rampant use of section 101 as a bar to patent
protection for recent advancements in the fields of computer science and biotechnology;142
accordingly, it appears Congress intends to return section 101 to its previous status as a relatively
minimal hurdle to patentability.143
On its face, the Tillis Draft Bill appears to reflect Congress’s intent to promote innovation
by redressing one of the Supreme Court’s recent blows to eligibility and redirecting the current
paradigm of patent law towards one favoring patentability.144 It must be noted, however, that
while many have voiced valid concerns with the current subject matter paradigm, others fear that
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overhauling the current doctrine, specifically the Alice/Mayo test, will negatively impact
innovation by arming “patent trolls.”145 An investigation into the interplay of patent trolls and the
Alice/Mayo test is beyond the scope of this comment. It is worth noting, however, that the threat
of patent trolls must be weighed against the danger of disincentivizing innovation more generally,
because too much restriction will upset the balance patent law seeks to promote. Even though the
Alice/Mayo test has been effective in combating this issue by, for instance, barring the protection
of most software claims,146 it has done so in an overly inclusive manner and other methods for
controlling trolls may be available. In sum, the draft bill represents a step in the right direction,
but it still carries with it the inescapable, yet mitigatable, issues stemming from judicial
interpretation. Congress should take this “blank slate” opportunity to prospectively bolster the
predictability of section 101 by implementing further changes beyond those already proposed in
the draft bill.
V. The Possible Outcome of the Section 101 Reform
While the reformed section 101 may appear to be a direct solution to the unpredictability
created by the Alice/Mayo test, it is unlikely to produce as radical a change in overall patentability
as the language of the reformed statute suggests. This is for two reasons, both of which will be
discussed in further detail below. First, the Court may use judicial review to simply find the reform
unconstitutional; however, there are ways for Congress to mitigate the risk of judicial review. The
second and more complex reason involves the Court simply moving the judicial exceptions to
another section of the Patent Act. In other words, even if the section 101 reform is unchallenged,
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the Court may formulate new doctrine serving the same purpose of the judicial exceptions under a
different section of the patent act, with 103 regarding obviousness being the likely candidate for
reasons discussed below.147 But that does not make the reform a wasted effort; rather, the Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit can and should use this fresh start as an opportunity to consider the
issues evinced by the Alice/Mayo test when crafting future doctrine.
While congress may reform section 101 and rely on its constitutional supremacy, it would
be wise for Congress to safeguard such reform efforts from the interpretive pitfalls present in the
current paradigm.148 In order to do so, Congress must recognize the interpretive pitfalls of the
draft bill and account for the Court’s potential response to the new legislation.149
A. How Congress Should Bolster the Reform
Interpretation plays a vital role in the creation of any judicially created doctrine. For
example, the judicial exceptions themselves can be seen as the product of the Court’s interpretation
of section 101 in light of the constitutional goal of patent law. In other words, the Court’s
contention that abstract ideas, natural laws, and phenomena should not be patent eligible can
rationally be viewed as supporting the constitutional goal of promoting the useful arts by
preventing expansive restrictions on innovation.150 While congress may reform section 101 and
rely on its constitutional supremacy, it would be wise to safeguard such reform efforts against
misinterpretation.151
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One obvious way in which Congress can mitigate the risk of misinterpretation involves
making their intentions as clear as possible. Without such intentions the courts may find it hard to
justify the facially radical proposal to completely abrogate the judicial exceptions.152 After all,
logic would dictate that one of the most direct ways to address interpretive issues associated with
any law or policy entails conveying the legislature’s intent in the most explicit and concrete
manner. Reformed section 101 clearly rejects conflation of the various patentability requirements,
but it does not directly address the valid concerns related to the complete abrogation of the judicial
exceptions.153 In other words, reformed section 101 can be plausibly read as allowing the patenting
of former judicial exceptions. If Congress intends for the other patentability requirements to
address the risks previously mitigated by the judicial exceptions, as reformed section 101 seems
to suggest, it should explicitly state that intent as it has with the assumption in favor of eligibility.154
Furthermore, this would promote consistent application of section 101 and stifle concerns
associated with the complete abrogation of the judicial exceptions, regardless of whether the other
patentability requirements can, in fact, replace the exceptions. This is because if Congress makes
this decision, the courts might feel less responsible for making the complex and somewhat
speculative determination of whether or not removal of the judicial exceptions actually promotes
innovation in a manner consistent with the Constitution. But Congress may also preempt the
danger of judicial review by supporting its decision with evidence, or at least a logical foundation,
in addition to explicitly voicing its intentions.
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Explicit congressional intent may not completely foreclose the Court from viewing
reformed section 101 as conflicting with the Constitution, and thereby refusing to recognize the
new provisions. Judicial review merely requires finding that “a law be in opposition with the
Constitution.”155

Providing explicit evidence of congressional intent may play a role in

determining whether a law is contrary to the Constitution, given the Court’s alleged deference to
Congress as the governmental entity best equipped for crafting law.156 But intent alone may not
prevent a judicial determination that reformed section 101 conflicts with the Constitution. This is
because the statutes actual impact on overall innovation is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately
predict.157 While it may be overkill, Congress should also provide evidence, or at least a rational
argument, as to why such judicial exceptions are unnecessary under section 101, or even contrary
to the goal of the Constitution. If Congress explicitly voices its belief that abrogation of the judicial
exceptions will not impede innovation, nor conflict with the Constitution, and supports this belief
with a reasonable basis or, better yet, statistical evidence, it would be even more difficult for the
courts to find a legitimate conflict between the statute and the Constitution.158 Put another way,
providing a logical foundation supporting the reformed section 101 should preempt the courts from
crafting policy, based on their own opinions, under the guise of judicial review.159
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B. The Collateral Effects of the Section 101 Reform
While Congress may reform the statutory language of section 101, the courts, as
interpreters of the statute, have a corresponding role in controlling the future of subject matter
eligibility. If the reform is accepted, any use of judicial exceptions will be explicitly barred from
the section 101 analysis, and the courts may account for this by moving the exceptions to other
patentability requirements like novelty and obviousness. 160 But this is not a bad thing. In fact,
Congress may have intended this, as reflected by explicitly barring the use of judicial exceptions
in determining patent eligibility only under section 101.161 After all, the judicial exceptions serve
an important purpose because broadly patenting natural laws or abstract ideas would contravene
the constitutional aim of patent law.162 Furthermore, the issues with the Alice/Mayo analysis do
not stem from its goal of preventing the monopolization of judicial exceptions, which is undeniably
in accordance with the constitutional goal of patent law;163 rather, the problem with the Alice/Mayo
test is the interpretive difficulties and uncertainty it introduces to the historically straight-forward
concept of subject matter eligibility.164 Obviousness, on the other hand, is an inherently subjective
concept and therefore better suited for the type of analysis the Alice/Mayo test entails.165
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Section 103 essentially states that an invention is invalid if, in light of the prior art, it would
be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.166 In one sense, all the Alice/Mayo test
really asks is whether an invention utilizes a judicial exception in such an inventive, or in other
words nonobvious, way that warrants patent protection. In fact, all that may really be required to
re-stabilize section 101 is recognition of the judicial exceptions as “prior art” so they may be used
to render an invention obvious. Section 102 of the Patent Act defines prior art for purposes of
section 102 and 103, with some nuances, as anything previously disclosed in a patent or
publication, or anything “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public.”167 It is
entirely reasonable to view natural laws and phenomena as being in public use or available to the
public due to their natural existence and discovery. The same goes for abstract ideas like hedging
financial risk, given its history of human use.168
In that case, reformed section 101 would have little practical impact on patentability in
general, aside from replacing the troublesome Alice/Mayo test with the standard novelty and
obviousness analyses; and that is precisely how the section 101 reform should be interpreted. For
example, cases like Mayo would still come out the same, albeit under section 103 rather than
section 101.169

In Mayo, the patented claims were ultimately found invalid because the

conventional steps of the process involved a judicial exception and did not satisfy the inventive
concept requirement of 101.170 The Court used the words routine and conventional, which
suggests that these steps would have also been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art.171
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In other words, the invention would likely have been obvious and invalid under section 103
anyways.172
Furthermore, moving the judicial exceptions to the obviousness inquiry would likely have
little effect on current section 103 doctrine. This is because the obviousness inquiry intrinsically
asks whether additional claim elements integrate the exception in a manner justifying patentability,
similar to the inventive concept found in the Alice/Mayo test.173 But that does not mean that
section 103 doctrine should not be modified to avoid some of the issues currently associated with
the Alice/Mayo analysis. For instance, if Congress concludes that patenting diagnostic tests aligns
with the constitutional goals of patent law,174 the reform should include an explicit exception for
these types of discoveries. But the current version of the reform does not include such language,
and since the draft bill does not modify or reform section 103, the court’s interpretation of the law
will control the future of the section.175 That being said, the courts should view the reform as an
opportunity to “move” the judicial exceptions to section 103 because doing so will solve the
interpretive issues associated with section 101 and the Alice/Mayo test while minimally impacting
overall patentability.
VI. Conclusion
The recent confusion and discord surrounding patent subject matter eligibility threatens to
undermine innovation in technological fields vital to modern society.179 Widespread concern and
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futile attempts to quell the recent chaos have evinced the need for congressional intervention, and
it appears Congress intends to address the issue.180 An analysis of the proposed section 101 reform
reveals that it may not produce as radical a change in overall patentability as the language may
suggest, nor should it. Instead, the reform provides a much-needed reorganization of the overall
patent eligibility inquiry and an opportunity for the judiciary to craft more appropriate doctrine
going forward. But the hurdle of judicial interpretation is ever present.
If Congress wishes to effectively promote consistent application of section 101 it must
bolster the language of its proposed reform to preemptively address the potential for
misinterpretation. Doing so requires at least two things. First, Congress must explicitly state that
it intends for other requirements of patentability to supplant the judicial exceptions. Second, it
must explicitly voice and support its belief that the other requirements of patentability—most
importantly obviousness—can effectively address the concerns currently addressed by the judicial
exceptions in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Accordingly, the future stability of
section 101, 103, and the field of patent law in general, lies in the hands of both Congress and the
courts.
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